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ABSTRACT 
Does sharing market information help channel partners to build stronger mutual 
relationships? Is low initial trust really an impediment for further relationship development 
by means of information sharing? How do connections with other competing channel partners 
affect the relationship building process? To address these questions, we conducted an 
experimental study.  
Our findings show that retailer information sharing helps to develop higher quality 
supplier relationships. Interestingly, even if the initial level of trust in the retailer is low, the 
relationship quality substantially improves. In a more competitive situation the suppliers 
respond more favorably to the retailers information-sharing initiative.  
 
Keywords: marketing channels, information-sharing, interfirm collaboration, 
experimental design 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of marketing information has proven to be critical for the development of a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Especially, the utilization of information within firm 
boundaries is known to enhance organizational performance (e.g., Maltz and Kohli, 1996). 
However, the relatively new business practice of sharing marketing information with channel 
partners can also contribute to a firms competitive position through the development of close 
and responsive channel relationships. Inter-firm relationships are increasingly recognized as a 
source for building unique company competences (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1999; Jap, 2001). 
Successful examples of information sharing can be found in contemporary retailing. 
Companies like Wal-Mart in the US, and the UK-based supermarket chain Tesco do not only 
capitalize on their position close to the consumer for their own sake, but they have also 
recognized the benefits of sharing the information about customers and their buying behavior 
with their upstream channel partners. Sharing real-time marketing information with these 
partners has helped them to create a responsive supplier network. 
Wal-Marts recent announcement to stop selling its data to market-research companies 
(such as A.C.Nielsen) and to give emphasis to sharing its data with channel partners 
(CBS.MarketWatch.com, May 12, 2001) demonstrates the strategic value of point-of-sale 
information. Wal-Mart's collaboration with Procter and Gamble features the privileged 
exchange of individual store data. Exchange of micro-level data enabled P&G to optimize its 
logistic operations and to respond to Wal-Mart's specific needs. Wal-Mart has now expanded 
this partnership-cooperation model, using Internet protocols, to other suppliers 
(InformationWeek.com, March 26, 2001). Tesco has also developed an Extranet-portal for its 
suppliers that provides these suppliers with real-time POS-data, information about service 
and stock levels, and which also allows them do collaborative planning and forecasting, and 
manage sales promotions. 
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Next to anecdotal evidence from practice, normative research also shows that sharing 
information improves supplier-reseller coordination. Improved coordination reduces supply 
chain costs in terms of shorter lead times (Lee, et.al, 2000), lower inventory costs (Gavirneni, 
et.al., 1999), and improved demand forecasts (Iyer and Bergen, 1997). Benefits become even 
greater when production capacity is limited (Gavirneni et.al., 1999), order batches are larger, 
lead times longer (Cachon and Fisher, 2000), and consumer demand volatile (Iyer and 
Bergen, 1997). Nowadays many retailers face such conditions: a turbulent market 
environment combined with production and logistics complexities. 
Despite the anecdotal evidence and the benefits predicted by normative research, many 
retail companies refrain from sharing their marketing information with their suppliers. The 
industry-wide platform for manufacturers and retailers, Efficient Consumer Response (ECR), 
has been promoting stronger collaboration between suppliers and retailers for many years. So 
far, only the willingness to share logistic information materialized into rapid-replenishment 
partnerships. Sharing marketing information as needed for category management is still 
rarely undertaken. A recent study among 375 managers shows that only 13% of the surveyed 
companies share their real-time market data with suppliers (InformationWeek, May 7, 2001). 
The literature offers several explanations for the hesitance of companies to share 
marketing information with channel partners. First, game-theorists argue that even if 
information sharing causes total channel profit to rise, the results for individual parties within 
the channel may very well be negative (Chu and Messinger, 1997). The asymmetric division 
of incremental earnings can result from a retailers loss of bargaining power if too much 
demand information is revealed (Desiraju and Moorthy, 1997). Retailers realize that 
preserving the threat to share information with a competing supplier strengthens their 
bargaining power. Actually sharing information with a specific channel partner would imply 
the loss of a powerful and rewarding threat (Seidmann and Sundararajan, 1997). 
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A second explanation for not passing on marketing information to channel partners may 
lie in the climate of many channel relationships. Business press articles suggest low levels of 
trust and commitment in relationships between retailers and suppliers. IT-enabled inter-firm 
coordination with a more open exchange of information was being met with distrust, 
ambivalence, and in some cases, open resistance by many players (Clemons and Row, 1993: 
p. 73). These conditions hamper information sharing in marketing channels. Only under good 
relational circumstances more intense information sharing will take place. Favorable 
relational circumstances are characterized by high levels of inter-organizational commitment 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992), by trust between parties (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), and by high 
rates of satisfaction about their relationships (Cannon and Perreault jr., 1999). All of these 
channel characteristics pay off in better performance (Kalwani and Narayanda, 1995; Cannon 
and Perreault jr. 1999). It is interesting to see if firms can break-out of a situation of low-
quality-poor-performing relationships by rewarding channel parties with valuable market 
information in order to build high-quality high-performing relationships.  
In this study we examine the effect of information sharing by a retailer on the 
development and quality of its relationships with suppliers. We also address two related 
issues. First, whether supplier trust in the retailer is necessary for information sharing to have 
a positive impact on relationship development? Specifically, we are interested in finding out 
whether the impact from information sharing is larger when the supplier-relationship is 
founded in a solid trust-base. A second issue refers to the fact that a retailer is often dealing 
with multiple suppliers. Exclusive information sharing arrangements make the retailers 
decision more complicated when the relationship portfolio contains competing suppliers. In 
competitive supplier markets, market information is especially valuable (Raju and Roy, 
2000). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that suppliers will especially appreciate 
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information that is provided on an exclusive basis. We study how competition between 
suppliers affects the relationship development potency of retailer information sharing. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we present a typology of 
information sharing arrangements. Second, we develop our research model on relationship 
development through information sharing. Third, we describe our methodology. Fourth, the 
results are described. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings. 
 
2 INFORMATION SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
Before we take a closer look at the effect of retailer information sharing on the development 
and quality of supplier relationships, we clarify what we mean with information sharing 
arrangements and how we can discern the different forms of arrangements. We define 
information sharing in marketing channels as an arrangement between channel members to 
share marketing information with the intention to strengthen the others performance and 
thereby the performance of the channel as a whole. An information sharing arrangement can 
be one-sided or two-sided. In this study we look at one-sided arrangements, i.e., where the 
retailer shares information with its suppliers. 
We distinguish two important dimensions of information sharing arrangements: content 
and exclusivity. The content of information that is being shared refers to the strategic nature 
of the information (e.g., Seidmann and Sundararajan, 1997). Going from low to high strategic 
nature we classify, on one side, logistic information (e.g., transaction-level information, like 
order-quantities and prices, inventory information) and on the other side market information 
(e.g., sales promotion-performance information of the supplier's own SKUs, performance of 
the whole product category). Exclusivity is the second dimension of information sharing and 
refers to the number of parties involved in the arrangement. It ranges from sharing with all 
suppliers (no exclusivity) to sharing with only one party (highly exclusive). 
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------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
Using these two dimensions we distinguish three main types of information sharing 
arrangements in marketing channels (see Figure 1). First, in order to improve logistic 
operations, a retailer and a supplier can (electronically) exchange order information in EDI 
arrangements or through Internet protocols. Such Continuous Replenishment  (CRP) 
arrangements involve low impact transaction-level information and are seldom on an 
exclusive basis. Usually the retailer encourages its whole supplier base to participate in these 
initiatives to streamline operations and product flows. A logical extension of this type of 
collaboration is to allow the supplier to supervise the retailers stock level in a Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI) arrangement. The retailer shares its aggregate inventory data (at 
distribution centers) with a supplier for that suppliers own stock-keeping units.  
A second and more advanced form of information sharing is a Joint Marketing Tactics 
Planning (JMTP) arrangement in which the retailer passes on actual sales-performance 
information on supplier's brands and where both parties jointly plan sales promotions. The 
previously mentioned Wal-Mart - Procter and Gamble partnership falls into this category. It 
features the privileged exchange of continuous individual store data. These (disaggregated) 
micro-level data cover sales, inventory and prices for each SKU P&G sells. Both parties 
coordinate sales promotional activities. 
The most far-reaching type of information sharing arrangement is Category Management 
(CM), where the retailer gives a supplier access to comprehensive marketing information. 
This information includes point-of-sale information of the brands of competitors in order to 
provide the full picture of the retailers market developments in the entire product category. 
Receiving this kind of information provides the supplier with an advantage over competing 
suppliers, because it is provided on an exclusive basis. 
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Typically, the degree of exclusivity is correlated with the strategic nature of the 
information (contents). Information that has a higher impact on operations is often shared on 
a more exclusive basis. Less strategic information is regularly passed on to many suppliers.  
Sharing marketing information with the highest strategic nature will cause the largest 
change in the relationship and is expected to have the biggest impact on supplier relationship 
development. Hence, our emphasis in this paper lies on this type of information sharing 
arrangement, that is Category Management. 
 
3 RESEARCH MODEL 
Our research model aims at describing the effect of the retailers information sharing 
activities on the development of its relationships with suppliers. Relationship development is 
defined here as the change in the quality of the relationship as perceived by the receiving 
party (i.e., the supplier). Our research model is graphically presented in Figure 2 and shows 
the influence of information sharing on the development of the relationship. We expect that 
the relational effect of information sharing will be moderated by two variables. 
The first moderating variable is the amount of trust in the retailer-supplier relationship 
before market information is being shared (initial trust). The second moderator is the extent 
to which relationships with various suppliers in the retailers portfolio of supplier-
relationships are being connected, i.e., compete with each other. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Relationship Quality 
In building a market-responsive supplier network, it is important for retailers to develop 
strong relationships with their suppliers. Suppliers in strong relationships are less prone to 
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leave the network and perform better (e.g., Kumar, Scheer and Stern, 1992; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994; Cannon and Perreault, jr, 1999). 
The construct relationship quality characterizes the state of the retailer-supplier 
relationship. The evaluation of the relationship quality is characterized here by two measures: 
the amount of satisfaction, and the level of commitment in the relationship. Whereas 
satisfaction predominantly evaluates the past performance of the relationship and measures 
its state retrospectively, commitment takes on a prospective perspective. Most frequently a 
channel members (i.c. supplier) satisfaction is defined as a positive state resulting from the 
appraisal of all the aspects of a firms working relationship with another form (in this case, 
the sharing retailer) (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale, 1983; Gaski and Nevin, 1985). Two types 
of satisfaction can be distinguished: economic and social satisfaction (Geyskens, Steenkamp 
and Kumar, 1999; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Economic satisfaction is defined as a 
channel members evaluation of economic outcomes that flow from the relationship with its 
partner such as sales volume, margins, and discounts (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). It 
concerns the evaluation of a relationship with respect to goal attainment. Social satisfaction is 
defined as a channel members evaluation of psycho-social aspects of the relationship, in that 
interactions within the exchange are fulfilling, gratifying, and facile. It concerns the 
satisfaction with the social outcomes of the relationship. 
Commitment is viewed as a critical indicator for future interactions in the relationship 
and has been defined as an implicit and or explicit pledge of relational continuity between 
exchange partners (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987). Different forms of commitment have been 
distinguished. First, when organizations want to continue relationships because they like and 
identify with the other, it is called affective commitment (e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 1992). 
Second, calculative commitment exists when a firm continues a relationship because of high 
switching costs (Kumar, Hibbard and Stern, 1994). 
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 Relationship Development  
Relationship quality is not a static construct. The nature of a relationship between two parties 
usually changes over time. The following phases in this process have been distinguished: (1) 
awareness, (2) exploration, (3) expansion, (4) commitment, and (5) dissolution (e.g., Dwyer, 
Schurr and Oh, 1987). In this study, we consider underdeveloped (exploration) and developed 
stages in relationships (expansion and commitment).  
During exploration, when each party gauges and tests the goal compatibility, integrity, 
and performance of the other, the interactions are aimed at meeting immediate business 
expectations of the partner and on establishing trust. The overall relationship quality is not 
high in this stage and a solid base of trust has not developed yet (This corresponds to the 
condition of low initial trust in our study). 
In the more developed stages, expansion and commitment, the exchange parties 
increasingly obtain more benefits from the relationship. Owing to established trust and joint 
satisfaction in the previous phase, parties put effort in expanding the relationship by 
increased risk-taking within the dyad (Dwyer, et.al., 1987: p. 18) through applying bonding 
technology, mutually adapting to specific partner needs and making transaction-specific 
investments. The orientation in the relationship is changed towards a longer-term and mutual 
expectations increase. At a certain point, the parties implicitly or explicitly pledge 
commitment and the relationship is connoted by solidarity and cohesion. Mutual goals 
are being set, and mutual adaptations and transaction-specific investments continue to take 
place. It means that the relationship quality has risen to a higher level, and a solid base of 
trust has developed (this corresponds to the high initial trust condition in our study). 
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The Impact of Information Sharing on Relationship Development 
Sharing marketing information can support the development of relationships through three 
mechanisms: (1) as a form of improved channel communication, (2) as an exercise of non-
coercive power, and (3) as a credible pledge for commitment.  
As improved communication; channel communication is the formal as well as informal 
sharing of meaningful and timely information between firms (Anderson and Narus, 1990). 
Qualitatively good communication exists when the relationship is characterized by open 
communications and sharing of information (Anderson and Weitz, 1992), which occurs 
frequently, bi-directionally, formal, and non-coercive (Mohr and Nevin, 1990). Better 
communication and information sharing contribute to improved channel operations, 
satisfaction and commitment (e.g. Mohr, Fisher and Nevin, 1996). Improved communication 
indirectly reduces the level of conflict through trust. Firms that have developed strong trust in 
their partners are more likely to work out disagreements with these partners (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990, p. 45). Through its impact on trust, information sharing indirectly affects 
commitment. (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Altogether, information sharing as a means of 
communication leads to less conflict, more trust, satisfaction, and commitment.  
As an exercise of non-coercive power, information sharing contributes to the 
development of supplier relationships through a second mechanism. Because suppliers value 
real-time market intelligence, retailers who collect timely and detailed shopper information 
have created a base of power over their suppliers. Sharing marketing information with a 
supplier can be conceived of as exercising a non-coercive power base: giving reward and 
assistance (as an influence strategy, see Boyle et.al. 1992). As such, the bestowal of 
marketing information will be evaluated as desirable and leading to more satisfaction (Hunt 
and Nevin, 1974; Gaski and Nevin, 1985) and a reduction of the level of conflict (Lusch, 
1976; Gaski and Nevin, 1985).  
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As a credible pledge for commitment: information sharing also supports relationship 
development because it can be regarded as a strong pledge of commitment of the retailer to 
the supplier. A pledge is an action undertaken by a channel member that demonstrates good 
faith and that binds it to the relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Interpreting marketing 
information as being of strategic value (as an asset) makes exclusive sharing comparable to 
an investment into the supplier relationship. The impact of such idiosyncratic investments in 
relationships is known to discourage abandoning each other and to increase commitment 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992). 
Based on these arguments described above we expect information sharing to improve 
relationship quality. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Information Sharing leads a positive change in the relationship 
quality as perceived by the receiving channel member. 
 
The Moderating Effect of Initial Trust 
It is interesting to study how trust moderates the impact of retailer information sharing. The 
perception of the other party as unreliable has often been an impediment for making any 
substantial partnership investment, like an intangible asset as sharing critical market 
information is (Wilson and Mummalaneni, 1988). Moreover, trust defined as the extent to 
which a firm believes that its exchange partner is honest and/or benevolent (Geyskens, et.al., 
1998) plays a central role in the development of relationships. It is generally considered as a 
critical (Wilson, 1995) or key variable (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) in the development of 
relationships. Only once trust is established, firms learn that joint efforts will lead to 
outcomes that exceed what the firm would achieve had it solely in its own interest (Anderson 
and Narus, 1990). Hence, we think of low trust as a barrier for further relationship 
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development. Earlier we have distinguished low initial trust relationships and relationships 
characterized by high initial trust. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 presents the expected impact of information sharing under the two different channel 
conditions. If the retailer refrains from employing information sharing as a tool to develop 
supplier relationships, it is logical that no change in the relationship is expected, regardless of 
the level of initial trust in the retailer (Cell 1 and Cell 2 in Table 1). 
If the retailer does decide to strengthen its supplier ties by sharing market information, it 
may encounter differential supplier responses, depending on the suppliers level of initial 
trust in the retailer. In the situation of high initial trust, a retailers decision to start sharing 
information basically responds to expectations already formed by the partner, and therefore 
the impact of information sharing on the relationship development will be positive (Cell 3). 
In low initial trust relationships the expectations of partners are short-term-oriented and 
focused at performance satisfaction. In such low initial trust circumstances, a retailers 
decision to share information conflicts with the suppliers previously held ideas about the 
retailer. A proposition to start sharing information will not be perceived as a credible pledge 
for commitment, and is received with skepticism. Hence, it will hardly have any effect on the 
quality of the relationship (Cell 4). 
In sum, we hypothesize the following moderating effect of initial trust on the impact of 
information sharing on relationship quality: 
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H2: The positive impact of information sharing on the relationship 
quality is positively affected by the level of initial trust. When 
the level of initial trust is low, there is no impact of information 
sharing on the relationship quality. When the level of initial 
trust is high, the impact of information sharing will be high. 
 
The Moderating Effect of the Connectedness between Supplier Relationships 
A second factor that we expect to influence the impact of information sharing on relationship 
quality, is the extent to which supplier relationships of the retailer are connected (Anderson, 
Hakansson, and Johanson, 1994). Connectedness is defined as: the degree to which the 
exchange in one relationship is contingent on the other.(Cook and Emerson, 1978). One 
specific form is negative connectedness, implying that the exchange in one relationship has 
negative consequences for the exchange in the other relationship (Ritter, 2000). 
In making strategic channel decisions about information sharing, retailers realize that 
teaming-up with one supplier may have consequences for the relationships with other 
(competing) suppliers. Since marketing information is especially valuable in competitive 
markets (Raju and Roy, 2000) suppliers with a retailer relationship that is embedded in a 
network with other negatively connected (competing) retailer-supplier relationships, will 
especially appreciate receiving information. Since an information sharing-arrangement and 
associated efforts (retailers dedication) represent a scarce resource, receiving channel 
partners will perceive exclusive information sharing as a privilege over their direct 
competitors. Therefore, retailer information sharing will have a larger impact on relationship 
quality if relationships with suppliers are more strongly (negatively) connected. 
We hypothesize that: 
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H3: The effect of information sharing is positively moderated by the 
level of (negative) connectedness of the dyadic relationship 
with other relationships. When the supplier-relationships are 
strongly negatively connected, the impact of information 
sharing on the relationship quality is higher. When the supplier-
relationships are weakly negatively connected, the impact of 
information sharing on the relationship quality is lower. 
 
4 RESEARCH METHOD 
To test our hypotheses on the effects of retailer information sharing on the development of a 
supplier-relationship we conducted a laboratory experiment. The experimental methodology 
has been regularly used in research in marketing channels (e.g, Stern, et.al, 1973; Busch and 
Wilson, 1976; Roering, 1977; Dwyer and Walker, 1981; Schurr and Ozanne, 1985; 
Eliashberg, et.al., 1986; Scheer and Stern, 1992). We used the experimental approach because 
it enabled use to test the causal direction of relationships between our variables of interest.  
Since our dependent variable is change in relationship quality, we had to be able to 
measure the quality of the relationship at different points in time with the same informants. 
Using a laboratory setting made this possible. The set-up of our experiment is comparable 
with experiments as designed by Andaleeb (1996) and Pilling et.al. (1994). Subjects had to 
solve a business case while adopting the role of a manager. 
We systematically manipulated three experimental variables: information sharing 
(INFOSH) (no/yes), initial trust (ITR) (low/high), and connectedness (CNNC) (low/high). All 
three variables had two levels, resulting in a 2 (between) * 2 (between) * 2 (between) 
factorial design, with eight experimental groups. 
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4.1 Experimental Materials and Procedure 
We developed a web-based presentation of a business case. The subjects were asked to adopt 
the role of an account-manage of a coffee roaster, called SMALSKO, and evaluated the 
quality of the relationship with a retailer, the supermarket chain SHOPHERE. By reading 
constructed company memos, trade journals, and market reports (e.g., Andaleeb, 1996; 
Pilling et.al., 1994), the subjects understood that the coffee roaster distributed its brand to end 
consumers through a large supermarket chain (called SHOPHERE).  
 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
It was emphasized that the coffee roasters marketing department values marketing 
information and that industry experts saw the supermarket chain as highly knowledgeable 
concerning consumer purchase behavior and shopping habits. The coffee roaster 
(SMALSKO) faced one major competitor (called NUTTREE) that also did business with the 
supermarket chain SHOPHERE (see Figure 3). 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 presents the sequential steps in the experimental procedure. At the start of the 
experiment, subjects received information about the focal company (the coffee roaster 
SMALSKO), its major competitor (NUTTREE), and the industry conditions (market size, 
growth, and distribution). Then, dependent on the experimental group they were in, they 
received information about the initial trust in the supermarket chain (low/high) and the 
connectedness (low/high).  
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The subjects company's initial trust in the retailer (ITR) was manipulated through a 
memo from a colleague account manager that dealt with the supermarket in the past (see 
Appendix I for an example of the memos). In the low-trust condition the memo stated: you 
should not trust SHOPHERE. I don't have many good things to say. I don't trust these people 
to be very 'up front' with us. An illustration of SHOPHERE's bad credibility from a former 
incident was also given. In the high trust condition the memo advised: you should trust 
SHOPHERE. I have many good things to say. I trust these people to be very 'up front' with 
us. and gives an illustration of the SHOPHERE's good credibility from a former incident. 
The manipulation proved to be successful and subjects with a low initial trust scenario 
viewed the retailers honesty and benevolence significantly lower than subjects with a high 
trust scenario (for honesty, t = -13.73; p<0.01 and for benevolence, t= -9.65; p<0.01). 
Market reports and an article from a renowned trade journal were presented the subjects 
to manipulate connectedness (CNNC). For the high-connectedness condition, it was made 
clear that the positioning strategies of the focal coffee coaster and its competitor NUTTREE 
were similar and both coffee brands competed for the same consumers. Also, the habit of 
price wars was reported and as a consequence consumers displayed a brand-switching 
behavior. Furthermore, an article from a trade journal stated that joint sales promotion efforts 
by the competitor in cooperation with the retailer had shown to hurt SMALSKOs sale.  
For the low-connectedness condition, a market report stated that the positioning 
strategies differed and SMALSKO and NUTTREE serve different consumer groups. Price 
wars were uncommon and consumers exhibited large brand-loyal behavior. This time, the 
article from the trade journal stated that joint sales promotion efforts by the competitor in 
cooperation with the retailer had shown not to hurt SMALSKOs sale (see Appendix II for 
the texts in each condition). 
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To determine whether our manipulation of the connectedness factor had been successful, 
subjects rated items from Anderson, Håkånsson and Johanson (1994)'s connectedness scale. 
This scale gauges the degree in which the exchange in one relationship is dependent on 
exchange of the partner with a third party. The connectedness manipulation proved to be 
successful: the respondents in the high-connected condition found their relationship with the 
retailer to be higher connected to the competitor-retailer relationship than the respondents in 
the low-connected condition (t = -3.48; p<0.01). 
After reading the case materials, the subjects evaluated the quality of the relationship 
with the retailer; measure t=1 of relationship quality. To stimulate the processing of the 
business case information, the questionnaire began with a few open-ended questions (e.g., "In 
your opinion, what is the business problem that the coffee roaster faces?" and "What would 
be your course of action?"). 
In the second part of the business case information was provided about the retailer's 
decision whether or not to start sharing (no/yes) information with the coffee roaster. The 
information that was being shared was Category Management Information (see Figure 1). 
Whether information was provided depended on the manipulation of the third experimental 
variable (INFOSH). After reading this part of the business case, the subjects were again asked 
to evaluate the relationship quality of the coffee roaster with the retailer.  
Finally, several control questions were posed in order to check whether the subjects had 
an idea about what the specific research goals were. Content analysis on the answers learned 
that this was not the case. Our web-based approach of administering the experiment provided 
us the opportunity to present our subjects high-quality stimulus materials (see Appendix I and 
II for examples of screens presented to the subjects). The business case was shown to 12 
managers from the food industry and their average judgment score on a scale ranging from 
unrealistic (1) to realistic (7) was 5.1 
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 4.2 Subjects 
Eighty master-level students participated in the experiment. They had all followed several 
courses in marketing. Their average age was 23 years and 60% was male. The students were 
paid for participating in the study, and to stimulate their involvement they were told that the 
person with the best business solution would be given a prize. The subjects were randomly 
assigned to an experimental group and the task took them approximately half an hour to 
finish.  
 
4.3 Measures 
As mentioned earlier we used two evaluative measures of the relationship quality: satisfaction 
and commitment. In measuring channel member satisfaction, we used the two separate 
multiple item scales from Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000): one for economic and one for 
social satisfaction. To measure commitment the multiple-item scale of Kumar, et.al. (1995) 
was used. This scale makes a distinction between calculative and affective commitment. The 
anchors for all items were 1 = strongly disagree to 7  strongly agree (see Appendix III for 
the list of items). 
Altogether we measured four different relationship quality dimensions: economic 
satisfaction, social satisfaction, affective commitment, and calculative commitment. 
 
4.4 Measurement Validation 
Conform the approach recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) we separated 
measurement validation from testing our hypotheses. We validated the measurements of the 
four latent relationship quality variables  economic and social satisfaction and calculative 
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and affective commitment  for the two points in time we measured them (t=1 and t=2; see 
Figure 4).  
First, we looked at the factor loadings of each item on their respective construct by 
performing an exploratory factor analysis. One item for economic satisfaction and thee items 
for commitment were deleted from further analyses for having a lower factor loading score 
than the cut-off value of .6  (cf. Hair et.al., 1998) at one or both of the measurement times 
(t=1 and/or t=2). 
Second, to confirm construct validity and reliability of the measurements of the 
constructs, we performed confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) on the covariances using 
LISREL 8.5. Consistent with our conceptualization, we estimated the measurement model of 
relationship quality consisting of the four-factors. The fit for each measurement time (t=1 and 
t=2) was good. The overall fit indices for t=1 were: χ2 = 102.85, RMSEA = 0.074 and 
CFI=0.96 and for t=2: χ2 = 130.16 and RMSEA = 0.10 and CFI=0.93. All items in the 4-
factor model demonstrated adequate convergent validity: their loadings on the hypothesized 
construct were significant with t-values ranging from 4.86 to 12.57 (for t=1) and from 4.59 to 
11.59 (for t=2) while no substantial cross-loadings were retained. Furthermore, when testing 
for discriminant validity, we looked at the constructs with the highest correlations (see Table 
4), and checked whether they were significant different from unity. Assuming a perfect 
correlation between social satisfaction and affective commitment, the model gave a much 
worse model fit (∆χ2 (1) = +38.11 (t=1) and ∆χ2 (1) = +47.08 (t=2)). Similar, when we 
assumed a perfect correlation between social satisfaction and calculative commitment, the 
model showed a worse fit (∆χ2 (1) = +74.13 (t=2) and ∆χ2 (1) = +63.61(t=2)). All measures 
had a composite reliability (α) greater than the minimum recommended level of 0.60 and 6 
out of 8 measures (i.e., 4 constructs measured twice) exceeded the preferred level of 0.70 
(Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978; see Appendix III for details).  
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Third, we also checked for alternative structures of the relationship quality construct, like 
the 1 overall-factor model and several 2-factor models. These models showed worse fits. 
The fourth and last step in our measurement validation was to test whether the 
measurements at the different times (t=1 and t=2) were structurally comparable. For this 
purpose we assessed the metric equivalence between both measurement times (cf. Steenkamp 
and Baumgartner, 1998)2. Configural invariance between t=1 and t=2 is ascertained by 
showing that the 4-factor model fits best in both times (t=1 and t=2). Furthermore, multi-
group CFA retrieves a good fit when invariant factor loadings, invariant factor correlations 
and invariant error are assumed (χ2 = 276.62 (df = 162); RMSEA = 0.095; CFI = 0.93). These 
results provide evidence of metric equivalence across the two measurement times, and shows 
that a comparison between them can be made in further analysis. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
The values for all four relationship quality variables were developed by calculating the 
unweighted averages of the subjects ratings on the individual items belonging to these 
constructs. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the constructs and the correlations 
between them. 
 
                                                 
2 Typical metric equivalence problems are related to cross-cultural comparisons (see Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner, 1998; an example in channel research is Cannon and Homburg, 2001). Rather than independent 
measures, this study has dependent samples, meaning that, the probability of having a comparable factor 
structure between the two measurements is higher.  
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5 RESULTS 
The data were analyzed using four separate ANOVAs with two repeated measures for each of 
the four dependent variables. The tested model contains three main effects: information 
sharing (INFOSH), initial trust in the retailer (ITR), connectedness (CNNC), and the two 
interaction effects of information sharing with initial trust (INFOSH x ITR) and with 
connectedness (INFOSH x CNNC). As we are interested in the (intra-supplier) change in 
relationship quality caused by retailer information sharing, we report the significance tests for 
the within-subject-effects in Table 3. Tables 4, 5, and 6 describe the results of our 
experiments. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.1 The Impact of Information sharing on Satisfaction and Commitment 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the results in Table 4 show that information sharing 
increases the suppliers satisfaction with and commitment to the relationship with the retailer. 
Information sharing is instrumental in lifting suppliers satisfaction with the retailer 
relationship in economic as well as social aspects. It leads to an increase in economic 
satisfaction of +0.65 points on average (F=8.13; p=0.01; see Table 4 and Figure 5A); relative 
to a 0.06 point average decline when retailers do not share information.  
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Figure 5A, 5B about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Second, information sharing also leads to more social satisfaction, meaning that the 
supplier is more satisfied with how the retailer conducts business. On average, the level of 
social satisfaction grows +1.44 with an information-sharing retailer, in comparison with a 
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small decline of 0.14 for relationships where no information is shared. (F=59.56; p<0.01; 
see Table 4 and Figure 5A). 
Additionally, information sharing leads to a greater willingness to make further 
investments in the relationship. A supplier becomes more calculative committed thanks to 
retailer information sharing; the rise in calculative commitment amounts to +1.04, when the 
retailer shares information, compared to a non-significant increase of +0.34 (F=6.92; p=0.01; 
see Table 4 and Figure 5B) for the situation where no information is being shared. 
Furthermore, a supplier feels stronger associated with an information-sharing retailer 
and is more pleased being a business partner of that retailer; as indicated by a greater increase 
in affective commitment (F=8.37; p<0.01; see Table 4 and Figure 5B).  
All in all, the results show that information sharing is good for building better 
supplier-relationships, and that out of the four different impacts, the suppliers social 
satisfaction experiences the strongest impulse from information sharing (eta squared = 0.45; 
see Table 3). Altogether, we accept hypothesis 1 for all four relationship quality dimensions. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 5 and Figure 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2 The moderating impact of Initial Trust  
Our second hypothesis is that the impact of information sharing on relationship quality is 
higher if the level of initial trust is high. The results in Table 5 and Figure 6 show that the 
increase in economic satisfaction caused by retailer information sharing is indeed greater 
when initial trust in the retailer is high (+0.99) relative to the low initial trust situations 
(+0.42). However, this interaction effect is not significant (F=0.89; p=0.35). 
Contrary to our hypothesis, in situations where a supplier has low trust in the retailer, the 
impact of information sharing has a larger impact on social satisfaction (+1.54 versus +1.36), 
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on calculative commitment (+0.76 versus +0.65) as well as on affective commitment (+0.70 
versus +0.49). These findings indicate that information sharing would be extra helpful in 
relationships with low initial trust, which even contradicts Hypothesis 2. Since none of 
reported effects are statistically significant (social satisfaction, F=0.05, p=0.82; calculative 
commitment, F=0.02, p=0.89; affective commitment, F=0.25, p=0.62; see Table 5), it appears 
that regardless the existing level of trust, retailer-supplier relationships quality always benefit 
from information sharing. Satisfaction and commitment are evenly lifted in low-trust as well 
as in high-trust relationships. We find no support for Hypothesis 2. 
Additionally, we find an interesting effect for the effect on social satisfaction. Under high 
initial trust social satisfaction drops (-.62) (significantly different from zero; t=-2.96; p<0.01), 
when the retailer does not share information. It means that under these high initial trust 
circumstances, the retailer harms the relationship by withholding information. A possible 
explanation is that in high-trust relationships, strong relational norms (Heide and John, 1992) 
have developed. Often relational norms relate to expectations about information sharing; in 
high-trust relationships, channel partners count on each other to be timely and accurately 
informed. Withholding information might be regarded as a violation of that rule resulting in 
supplier disappointment and a lower social satisfaction with the relationship. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 6 about here 
Please Insert Figure 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
5.3 The moderating impact of Connectedness 
The third hypothesis states that retailer information sharing will have a larger impact in 
instances where the supplier faces fiercer competition. We find mixed effects. On the one 
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hand, the level of connectedness of the supplier relationship does augment the impact of 
information sharing in increasing economic and social satisfaction, and affective commitment 
(see Table 6 and Figure 7). On the other hand, the impact of information sharing on 
calculative commitment is similar for the two levels of connectedness (+0.65 versus +0.78). 
As for economic satisfaction, in low-connected relationships information sharing is not 
viewed as economic attractive and economic satisfaction is hardly affected (-0.17) (t = 0.73; 
p=0.48). However, when supplier relationships are in strong competition (high-connected), 
suppliers much appreciate information sharing as economically desirable and consequently 
economic satisfaction is increased (+1.61) (F=12.67; p<0.01). 
The impact of information on social satisfaction becomes even larger in high-connected 
relationships (+1.97), compared with a rise of +1.16 in low-connected relationships (+1.16) 
(F=3.92; p=0.05). 
As for future commitments to the relationship, the impact of information sharing only 
changes affective commitment (F=4.02 ; p=0.05). With the help of information from the 
retailer, the supplier in high-connected relationships only creates an extra sense of 
association, yet no gain in commitment in a calculative way (F=0.04; p=0.85). A possible 
explanation for that might be the high scores of calculative commitment are already high, 
around six, which makes it difficult to raise them further (i.e., a ceiling effect). 
In sum, we accept Hypothesis 3 for changes in economic and social satisfaction, and 
affective commitment. No support was found for calculative commitment. 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Please Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7 summarizes the supported and the unsupported hypotheses in this study.  
 
 
 25
6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the promising benefits of information-intensive retailer-supplier collaboration in 
turbulent market environments, one frequently named obstacle why retailers refrain from 
extensive information sharing is that relationships between retailers and suppliers are often 
characterized by mistrust. Retailer information sharing can be helpful in building stronger 
supplier relationships because it may improve communication between the channel parties, it 
can signify a gift of a reward, and because it may serve as a pledge for commitment to the 
relationship. In this study we examined the effects of information sharing by a retailer on the 
development and quality of its relationships with suppliers. 
The results show that retailer information sharing improves the supplier relationship 
quality. The receiving party not only becomes more economically and socially satisfied with 
the retailer dealings, but it also feels more committed (affective commitment) and it promises 
to put more effort in the relationship with the retailer (calculative commitment). 
We expected that the positive impact caused by information sharing could only take 
place when initial trust in the relationship had been established. Our findings, however, show 
that the improvement in supplier-relationship quality is as large in low-trust relationships as 
in high-trust relationships. Clearly regardless of the level of initial trust in the retailer, the 
supplier appreciates the extra retailers information.  
With respect to the retailer portfolio of competing supplier relationships, we expected 
that the degree of connectedness between the relationships moderates the relationship-
strengthening effect of information sharing. Our findings indeed show that the impact is 
dependent on the competitive situation in which the supplier finds itself. In more fierce 
competition with another supplier, reflected by negative connectedness, the positive impact 
of information sharing is amplified for economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, and 
affective commitment. 
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Our study responds to a number of calls in previous research. Myers et.al. (2000) 
suggested to conduct further research on how channel cooperation impacts relationship 
closeness. Instead of implementing an operational partnership, like automated replenishment 
programs (ARP) (in this paper referred to as CRP and VMI), we examined a more strategic 
form of interfirm partnerships (as mentioned in Mentzer, et.al., 2000), category management¸ 
which implies a relationship adaptation to a high degree. An important lesson from our study 
is that such strategic information sharing has an additional pay-off in improving the 
relationship quality. Our examination of relational effects of information sharing also meets 
Frazier (1999: p.229)s call for research on the consequences of sharing intelligence.  
 
Within the boundaries of our experimental setting, we conclude that our study 
encourages retailers to share information with suppliers because this improves the 
relationship quality. Furthermore, we find that information sharing works also in the case of 
low initial trust, which results in the recommendation to retail managers (e.g., category 
managers, buyers) to start sharing information already in the early stages of the relationship. 
Sharing information can accelerate the relationship development process. In high-trust 
relationships, the retail manager must be aware of possible disappointments in these supplier 
relationships. Not sharing in such relationships may even lead to a decline in social 
satisfaction, which may be an omen for further relationship decay. In a sense there is thus a 
need for maintenance investments in the relationship. 
A final implication for retail managers concerns their dealings with competing 
suppliers. In competitive environments, suppliers appreciate receiving retailer information 
much more, and it would thus be interesting to pursue information sharing-strategies in these 
competitive product categories. However, in such cases retailer will be confronted with a 
dilemma. When engaging into an information sharing arrangement with one supplier and 
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enhancing that particular relationship, the retailer might damage the relationships with other 
competing suppliers. This latter effect was not included in this study. 
Managers need to take into consideration is that this study focuses on the rosy view of 
information sharing (cf. interfirm-learning, Mohr and Sengupta, 2002): eliciting favorable 
relationship responses with the intention to build better performing supplier relationships. 
Undeniably, there are notable risks associated with sharing market information. Not only 
leakage and misusage of the information, but also outlearning by the receiving info-partner 
can make the sharing firm to become obsolete in the (near) future. All these concerns reflect 
the risky view of information sharing and raise the issue of controlling the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by the partner firm. Further research is needed on how retail firms can 
safeguard these information sharing risks without restraining the supplier relationship 
development. Despite the fact that information sharing can improve the quality of a 
relationship it is thus not always advisable to actually pursue this activity. Organizations have 
to make a trade-off between the benefits and costs (i.e., loss of power and a possible negative 
impact on other channel relationships). 
 
As with any laboratory study, it is important to be prudent in generalizing from the 
findings. However, the fact that that business managers from the food industry have judged 
the business case as realistic supports the external validity of the results from this first study 
on understanding the effect of information sharing. Future research in real-life settings should 
corroborate our findings. 
Within our current research setting two issues call for additional research. First, 
retailers increasingly play the role of director in orchestrating the supply chain. Therefore, the 
aspect of exclusivity (or preferred supplier) has become of major interest in businesses today. 
Results from a large-scale qualitative research on future developments in the food supply 
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chain, State of the Art in Food by CGE&Y, states that manufacturers will increasingly face 
difficulties in becoming a preferred supplier to more than one large retailer. Flemming 
Lindeløv, former CEO Carlsberg Breweries, the worlds fourth largest brewery, predicts: If 
two retailers are competing against each other, the same supplier cannot maintain its 
[preferred] position with both. Its a power thing. [] I envisage a situation where main 
suppliers will be involved in the competition between the main retailers in a certain market. 
[A retailer] will not allow [a manufacturer] to service [his] main competitor in the same way 
as [a manufacturer] do[es] to [him]. (Grievink, et.al., 2002:p. 229). Therefore, it would be 
interesting to investigate the feature of partnership exclusivity in sharing to a greater extent. 
For instance, the inclusion of an experimental condition in which the retailer starts sharing 
information with a competing supplier might have strong negative consequences for the 
supplier relationships with whom the retailer does not choose to share: channel partners in 
competing channels (Ritter, 2000). A second interesting research issue is to investigate the 
added value of the exclusivity-feature of sharing market information itself by examining the 
effect of the retailers decision to share with all (competing) suppliers in the product 
category. 
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 FIGURE 1 TYPES OF INFORMATION SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
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FIGURE 2  RESEARCH MODEL 
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FIGURE 3 MARKETING CHANNEL SITUATION AS DEPICTED IN SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 5B MAIN EFFECTS INFORMATION SHARING ON  
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FIGURE 6A INTERACTION EFFECT INFORMATION SHARING AND INITIAL TRUST ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SATISFACTION 
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 FIGURE 6B INTERACTION EFFECT INFORMATION SHARING AND INITIAL TRUST ON CALCULATIVE AND AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT 
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FIGURE 7A INTERACTION EFFECT INFORMATION SHARING AND CONNECTEDNESS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SATISFACTION 
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FIGURE 7B INTERACTION EFFECT INFORMATION SHARING AND CONNECTEDNESS ON CALCULATIVE AND AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT 
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 TABLE 1 INFORMATION SHARING UNDER DIFFERENT CHANNEL CONDITIONS 
 
 Low Initial Trust  
Channel Relationships 
 
High Initial Trust  
Channel Relationships 
 
 
 
No Information 
sharing 
 
 
No change in relationship quality 
(∆RQ = 0 ) 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
No change in relationship quality 
 (∆RQ = 0 ) 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
Information 
sharing 
 
Information sharing has no effect on 
relationship development  
(∆RQ = 0 ) 
 
(4) 
 
Improvement in  
relationship development  
(∆RQ = + ) 
 
(3) 
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 TABLE 2  MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS 
 Means Std. Dev. Correlations
 
t=1  
Economic 
Satisfaction
Social 
Satisfaction
Calculative 
Commitment
Economic Satisfaction (ES1) 5.04 1.48
Social Satisfaction (SS1) 3.55 1.81 .227
(.043)
Calculative Commitment (CC1) 5.10 1.13 .355
(.001)
.433
(<.001)
Affective Commitment (AC1) 3.85 1.64 .266
(.018)
.761
(<.001)
.439
(<.001)
t=2   
Economic Satisfaction (ES2) 5.33 1.06
Social Satisfaction (SS2) 4.18 1.57 .348
(.002)
Calculative Commitment (CC2) 5.78 0.97 .468
(<.001)
.556
(<.001)
Affective Commitment (AC2) 4.36 1.34 .161
(.153)
.710
(<.001)
.349
(.002)
 
N.B. Two-tailed probability stands between brackets. 
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TABLE 3 THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SHARING ON SATISFACTION AND COMMITMENT 
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
Dependent variable: Change in Relationship Quality Degrees 
of freedom
Mean 
Square
F Value p-value η2
Economic Satisfaction  
- Constant 
- Information sharing (INFOSH) 
- Initial Trust in Retailer (ITR) 
- Connectedness (CNNC) 
- INFOSH x ITR 
- INFOSH x CNNC 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
3.84
5.67
0.01
0.17
0.62
8.84
0.70
5.50 
8.13 
0.02 
0.25 
0.89 
12.67 
 
0.02
0.01
0.90
0.62
0.35
<0.01
0.07
0.10
<0.01
<0.01
0.01
0.15
Social Satisfaction  
- Constant  
- Information sharing (INFOSH) 
- Initial Trust in Retailer (ITR) 
- Connectedness (CNNC) 
- INFOSH x ITR 
- INFOSH x CNNC 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
16.71
23.94
8.75
0.49
0.02
1.58
0.40
41.58 
59.56 
21.78 
1.22 
0.05 
3.92 
 
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.27
0.82
0.05
0.36
0.45
0.23
0.02
<0.01
0.05
Calculative Commitment  
- Constant 
- Information sharing (INFOSH) 
- Initial Trust in Retailer (ITR) 
- Connectedness (CNNC) 
- INFOSH x ITR 
- INFOSH x CNNC 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
18.49
4.77
0.52
2.37
0.01
0.03
0.69
26.83 
6.92 
0.75 
3.43 
0.02 
0.04 
<0.01
0.01
0.39
0.07
0.89
0.85
0.30
0.09
0.01
0.05
<0.01
<0.01
Affective Commitment  
- Constant 
- Information sharing (INFOSH) 
- Initial Trust in Retailer (ITR) 
- Connectedness (CNNC) 
- INFOSH x ITR 
- INFOSH x CNNC 
- Error 
1
1
1
1
1
1
73
11.27
3.55
9.20
0.21
0.11
1.70
0.42
26.58 
8.37 
21.71 
0.49 
0.25 
4.02 
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.48
0.62
0.05
0.27
0.10
0.23
<0.01
<0.01
0.05
  
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01   
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TABLE 4  THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION SHARING ON SATISFACTION AND COMMITMENT 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATION 
 t=1 t=2  Change{ (t=2)  (t=1) } 
 Mean (std. dev) Mean (std. dev) Mean (std. dev)
Economic Satisfaction 
No information sharing 5.15 (1.45) 5.09 (1.07) - 0.06 (1.24)
Information sharing 4.92 (1.52) 5.58 (1.00) + 0.65* (1.28)
 
Social Satisfaction 
No information sharing 3.63 (1.91) 3.50 (1.49) - 0.14 (1.00)
Information sharing 3.46 (1.71) 4.90 (1.31) + 1.44** (1.05)
 
Calculative Commitment 
No information sharing 5.18 (1.03) 5.52 (1.15) + 0.34 (1.22)
Information sharing 5.02 (1.23) 6.06 (0.64) + 1.04** (1.12)
 
Affective Commitment 
No information sharing 3.98 (1.59) 4.21 (1.38)
Information sharing 3.71 (1.69) 4.52 (1.28)
 
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01  
 
 
 
*
*
 
 49**+ 0.22 (1.02)
+0.81* (1.08)****** 
  
TABLE 5  EFFECT OF INFORM  SHARING  
ON SATISFACTION AND CO
IN LOW-TRUST AND HIGH-TRUS
     
 
 
 t=1  
 Mean (std.dev) Me
Economic Satisfaction 
 
   - Low Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.53 (1.57)
          Information sharing 5.11 (1.67)
 
   - High Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.74 (1.04)
          Information sharing 4.75 (1.37)
 
Social Satisfaction 
 
   - Low Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 1.89 (0.72)
          Information sharing 2.06 (0.62)
  
   - High Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.29 (0.94)
          Information sharing 4.79 (1.30)
 
Calculative Commitment 
 
   - Low Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.67 (1.10)
          Information sharing 4.68 (1.39)
 
   - High Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.66 (0.67)
          Information sharing 5.33 (0.99)
 
Affective Commitment 
 
   - Low Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 2.75 (0.88)
          Information sharing 2.41 (1.12)
 
   - High Initial Trust Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.16 (1.17)
          Information sharing 4.88 (1.19)
 
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01  
 
 50ATIONMMITMENT 
T RELATIONSHIPS 
t=2  Change { (t=2)  (t=1) } 
an (std.dev) Mean (std.dev)
4.60 (1.14) + 0.08 (1.57) +0.42
5.61 (0.98) + 0.50 (1.67)*
 
5.55 (0.77) - 0.19 (1.04) +0.99
5.55 (1.05) + 0.80 (1.37)*
 
2.26 (0.85) + 0.37 (0.78)* +1.54
3.97 (1.09) + 1.91 (0.89)**
4.67 (0.87) - 0.62 (0.96)** +1.36
5.78 (0.81) + 0.98 (1.00)**
5.10 (1.15) + 0.43  (1.41) +0.76
5.88 (0.68) + 1.19 (1.24)**
5.92 (1.03) +0.25 (1.02) +0.65
6.23 (0.56) +0.90 (1.00)**
3.42 (1.09) + 0.67 (0.64)** +0.70
3.79 (1.10) + 1.37 (0.83)**
4.97 (1.21) - 0.19 (1.14) +0.49
5.18 (1.05) + 0.30 (1.03)
 TABLE 6    EFFECT OF INFORMATION SHARING  
ON SATISFACTION AND COMMITMENT 
IN LOW-CONNECTED AND HIGH-CONNECTED RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 t=1  t=2  Change { (t=2)  (t=1) } 
 Mean (std.dev) Mean (std.dev) Mean (std.dev)
Economic Satisfaction 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.76 (1.63) 5.10 (1.21) +0.33 (1.29) -0.17
          Information sharing 5.50 (1.07) 5.66 (1.09) +0.16 (0.94)
  
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.55 (1.13) 5.08 (0.94) -0.48 (1.07) +1.61
          Information sharing 4.38 (1.69) 5.50 (0.93) +1.13 (1.39)**
 
Social Satisfaction 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 3.78 (2.05) 3.71 (1.60) -0.06 (1.14) +1.16
          Information sharing 3.86 (2.11) 4.96 (1.58) +1.10 (1.11)**
  
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 3.48 (1.79) 3.27 (1.37) -0.22 (0.84) +1.97
          Information sharing 3.08 (1.15) 4.84 (1.04) +1.75 (0.90)**
 
Calculative Commitment 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.19 (1.04) 5.79 (0.95) +0.60 (1.24)* +0.65
          Information sharing 4.91 (1.43) 6.16 (0.66) +1.25 (1.38)**
 
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 5.17 (1.05) 5.23 (1.30) +0.07 (1.16) +0.78
          Information sharing 5.12 (1.04) 5.97 (0.62) +0.85 (0.78)**
 
Affective Commitment 
 
   - Low-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 4.13 (1.58) 4.48 (1.24)  +0.35 (1.05) +0.18
          Information sharing 3.96 (1.83) 4.49 (1.42) +0.53 (1.00)*
 
   - High-Connected Relationships 
          No information sharing 3.83 (1.63) 3.93 (1.49) +0.10 (0.99) +0.99
          Information sharing 3.46 (1.56) 4.52 (1.14) +1.09 (1.10)**
 
*  p < 0.05; **  p < 0.01  
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 TABLE 7 SIGNIFICANCE AND DIRECTION TESTED EFFECTS 
 
 INFOSH 
(H1) 
INFOSH*ITR 
(H2) 
INFOSH* CNNC 
(H3) 
Change in     
Economic Satisfaction + n.s. + 
Social Satisfaction + n.s. + 
Calculative Commitment + n.s. n.s. 
Affective Commitment + n.s. + 
n.s. = not significant    
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APPENDIX I  SAMPLE SCREENS WEB-BASED PRESENTATION BUSINESS CASE 
 
Low Initial Trust 
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High Initial Trust 
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APPENDIX II  SAMPLE SCREENS WEB-BASED PRESENTATION BUSINESS CASE (2) 
 
Low Connectedness 
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High Connectedness 
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 APPENDIX III  MEASURES OF CONSTRUCTS 
 
RELATIONSHIP QUALITY  MEASURES 
 
 
 
  
Economic Satisfaction (Adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000) 
 
 Calculative Commtiment (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 1995) 
SAT1 Its relationship with {SUPERMARKET S} has provided {YOUR 
COMPANY} with a dominant and profitable market position. 
 COM7 If {SUPERMARKET S} requested it, {YOUR COMPANY} is 
willing to make further investment in supporting 
{SUPERMARKET S}'s coffee assortment. 
SAT2 {YOUR COMPANY}s relationship with {SUPERMARKET S} is 
a very attractive one in economic terms. 
 COM8 
 
{YOUR COMPANY} is willing to put more effort and investment 
in building their business with {SUPERMARKET S}. 
SAT3* {YOUR COMPANY} is very pleased with the high distribution 
coverage that SHOPHERE provides. 
 COM9 
 
In the future {YOUR COMPANY} will work to link their firm 
with {SUPERMARKET S}'s in order to serve the consumer 
better. 
     
Cronbachs alpha (t1, t2): 0.67 , 0.63 
Mean (t1, t2): 5.04 , 5.33 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.48 ,  1.06 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 2 to 7  
 Cronbachs alpha (t1, t2): 0.84 , 0.84 
Mean (t1, t2): 3.85 , 1.64 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.64 , 1.33 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 1 to 7 
 
 
  
Social Satisfaction (Adapted from Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000) 
 
 Affective Commitment (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 1995) 
SAT4 Interaction between {SUPERMARKET S} and {YOUR 
COMPANY} are characterized by mutual respect. 
 COM1  
 
Even if {YOUR COMPANY} could, they would not drop 
{SUPERMARKET S} because they like being associated with 
them. 
SAT5 {SUPERMARKET S} is very open towards {YOUR COMPANY} 
about things that {YOUR COMPANY} ought to know. 
 COM2 {YOUR COMPANY} wants to remain a member of the 
{SUPERMARKET S}'s network, because they genuinely enjoy 
their relationship with them. 
SAT6 {YOUR COMPANY}'s relationship with {SUPERMARKET S} 
reflects a happy situation. 
 COM3 {YOUR COMPANY}'s positive feelings towards 
{SUPERMARKET S} are a major reason they continue working 
with them. 
SAT7 The relationship between the two companies is very positive.  COM4* 
 
{YOUR COMPANY} expects their relationship with 
{SUPERMARKET S} to continue for a long time. 
SAT8 {YOUR COMPANY} is very satisfied with {SUPERMARKET S}.  COM5* Renewal of the relationship with {SUPERMARKET S} is 
virtually automatic. 
SAT9 In general, {YOUR COMPANY} is pretty happy with its dealing 
with {SUPERMARKET S}. 
 COM6* It is likely that {YOUR COMPANY} will continue doing business 
with {SUPERMARKET S} during the following 2 years. 
Cronbachs alpha (t1, t2): 0.96 , 0.97 
Mean (t1, t2): 3.55 , 4.18 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.81 , 1.57 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 1 to 7 
 Cronbachs alpha (t1, t2): 0.84 , 0.84 
Mean (t1, t2): 3.85 , 4.35 
Standard deviation (t1, t2): 1.64 , 1.32 
Range (t1, t2): 1 to 7 , 1 to 7 
* These items were deleted from further analysis   
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 APPENDIX IV  MEASURES OF CONSTRUCTS 
 
MANIPULATION CHECKS 
 
 
 
  
Honesty as part of Trust (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 
1995) 
 Benevolence as part of Trust (Adapted from Kumar, Steenkamp and Scheer, 
1995) 
HON1 Even when {SUPERMARKET S} gives {YOUR COMPANY} a 
rather unlikely explanation, {YOUR COMPANY} is confident that 
they are telling them the truth. 
 BEN1 Though circumstances change, {YOUR COMPANY} believes that 
{SUPERMARKET S} will be ready and willing to offer them 
assistance and support. 
HON2 {SUPERMARKET S} often provides {YOUR COMPANY} 
information, which later proves to be inaccurate ( r ) 
 BEN2 When making important decisions, {SUPERMARKET S} is 
concerned about {YOUR COMPANY}'s  welfare. 
HON3 {SUPERMARKET S} usually keeps the promises they make to 
{YOUR COMPANY}. 
 BEN3 When {YOUR COMPANY} shares their problems with 
{SUPERMARKET S}, they know that {SUPERMARKET S} will 
respond with understanding. 
HON4 Whenever {SUPERMARKET S} gives {YOUR COMPANY} 
advice on their business operations, we know they are sharing 
their best judgment. 
 BEN4 In the future {YOUR COMPANY} can count on {SUPERMARKET 
S} to consider how its decisions and actions will affect them. 
HON5 {YOUR COMPANY} can count on {SUPERMARKET S} to be 
sincere. 
 BEN5 When it comes to things, which are important to {YOUR 
COMPANY}, they can depend on the {SUPERMARKET S}'s 
support. 
Cronbachs alpha (t1): 0.87 
Mean (t1): 4.22 
Standard deviation (t1): 1.60 
Range (t1): 2 to 7 
 Cronbachs alpha (t1): 0.90 
Mean (t1): 3.48 
Standard deviation (t1): 1.36 
Range (t1): 1 to 7 
 
Connectedness (Adapted from Hakansson, Anderson and Johanson, 1994) 
 
CNC1 If supermarket chain {SUPERMARKET S} starts cooperating 
with competitor {YOUR COMPETITOR}, {SUPERMARKET S} 
makes it difficult to work together with {YOUR COMPANY}. 
CNC2 Too close a relationship between {SUPERMARKET S} and 
{YOUR COMPETITOR} will destroy the balance between 
{YOUR COMPANY} and {SUPERMARKET S}. 
CNC3 Collaboration of {SUPERMARKET S} with {YOUR 
COMPETITOR} is harmful to {SUPERMARKET S}s 
relationship with {YOUR COMPANY}. 
CNC4 Although {SUPERMARKET S}s working together with {YOUR 
COMPETITOR} will likely provide some benefits to them, 
{YOUR COMPANY} may not be happy about this. 
  
  
Cronbachs alpha (t1): 0.78 
Mean (t1): 5.1  
Standard deviation (t1): 1.12  
Range (t1): 2 to 7 
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